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1. INTRODUCTION. 
In subjective probability theory, a probability space (Q, 
JQ., P) is characterized by a set of worlds n, a Boolean 
algebra 4! of subsets of Q and a probability measure P 
defmed on JQ.. Let m be the world that corresponds to the 
actual sate of affairs. We ignore which world corresponds 
tom. We only know the strength P(A) of our belief that 
me A, for all Ae JQ.. The normalization of P is an axiom 
of the theory: P(Q) = 1. 
In the transferable belief model (TBM), the model we 
developed to quantify beliefs and that covers the same 
domain of application as the subjective probability 
measures, we distinguish between an open-world and a 
close-world context (Smets 1988, Smets and Kennes 
1990). In the open-world context beliefs are not 
necessarily normalized. The nature of this possible lack of 
normalization is analysed in this paper. 
The TBM is characterized by an unitary mass of belief that 
is distributed among the subsets of a finite frame of 
discernment n. For At;;;;Q, m(A) is the portion of our 
total initial belief supporting A l and that could support 
1 To support A means to support me A. 
any subset of A if further information justifies it, but 
given the available information m(A) supports only A. 
The function m:20-+ [0,1) is called a basic belief 
assignment (bba) and the m values are called the basic 
belief masses (bbm), with 
I, m(A)::: 1 
At;;;;Q 
Based on the bba m, the functions bel(A) and pl(A) are 
defined for A<;;;Q by: 
bel(A)::: I. m(X) (1) 
0;i:Xt;;;;A 
pl(A)= L m(X) (2) 
AnX� 
bel(0) ;:: pl(0) = 0. 
Hence pl(A) = bel(Q) - bel( A) 
bel(Q) = pl(Q) = 1 - m(0) � 1. 
For all A t;;;;Q, bel( A) (read the belief of A) represents the 
degree of justified specific support given to A and pi (A) 
(read the plausibility of A) represems the degree of 
potential specific support that could be given to A. 
We say specific because the bbm's m(X) included in 
bel( A) are those that support A without supporting A. 
Hence X must be a subset of A without being a subset of 
A, i.e. X¢0. So m(0) is not included in bel(A). 
Identically it is not included in pi(A) as pi(A) includes the 
bbm given to sets X compatib1e with A, and 0 is not 
compatible with A. 
We say justified because only the bbm's given to subsets 
of A are included in bel(A). For instance, consider two 
distinct elements X and y of Q. The bbm m({x,y}) given 
to (x,y) could support x if further information indicates 
this. However given the available information the bbm 
can only be given to ( x,y}. 
We say potential because the bbm included in pl(A) could 
be transferred to non empty subsets of A if some new 
information could justify such a transfer. It would be the 
case if we learn that all the worlds in A are impossible. 
The fact that, after such a conditioning, the updated belief 
given to A will be equal to pl(A) reflects the fact that 
pl(A) is the maximal support that might be given to A. In 
particular, subsets X<::Q for which it is accepted that 
me X receive a null plausibility. If it was not the case, 
then appropriate updating could induce a positive support 
to X, thus making supported worlds that were accepted as 
not including m. 
A n  important element of the TBM is the 
acknowledgement that a positive bbm can be allocated to 
the empty set or equivalently that bel(Q) and pl(Q) can 
both be less than one. The bbm m(0) can be viewed as a 
missing mass as it is equal to 1-pl(Q). On the contrary, 
Shafer (1976) defines a belief function such that m(0)"'0 
or equivalently bel(O);;;;pl(Q)"'l. 
In order to analyse the nature of m(0)>0, we define the 
nature of the frame of discernment in section 2. In section 
3, we explain the conditioning process used in the TBM. 
In section 4, we explain the origin of the positive bbm 
given to 0. In section 5, we analyse the case where the 
frame of discernment is not exhaustive. We summarize the 
results in section 6. 
2. THE FRAME OF DISCERNMENT. 
In the TBM, bel quantifies the strength of the beliefs held 
by a given agent Y at a given time t that an actual state of 
affairs m belongs to subsets of possible worlds. The 
domain of Y's beliefs at time t is a set of distinct possible 
worlds, one of them, denoted m, corresponds to the actual 
state of affairs (Carnap 1956, 1962, Ruspini 1986). This 
set, is denoted by OLand called the frame of discernment. 
It is defined as follows. 
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2.1. THE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF QL· 
Let L be a finite propositional language. Let QL "' { w 1. 
(1)2, ... ron} be the set of worlds that correspond to the 
interpretations of L. Propositions identify the subsets of 
.OL. Let T be the tautology and l. be the contradiction. 
For any proposition X, let ff X D <;;; OL be the set of worlds 
identified by X. Let A be a subset of nL, then fA is any 
proposition that identifies A. So A"'ff fAD, 0"'[ l.D and 
nL "'[ TD. The domain of bel and pl are sets of worlds in 
OL· By definition the actual world m is an element of OL. 
Given a frame of discernment OL, the complement A of 
a set of worlds At;;;QL is the complement of A relative to 
OL. It corresponds to ff -,fA]. 
2.2. THE EVIDENTIAL CORPUS. 
The beliefs held by Y on QL at time t are based on the set 
of all the pieces of evidence held by Y at time t. This set 
os called the evidential corpus and denoted EC7. Updating 
of EC� can be obtained by adding a new piece of evidence 
to EC7. Let t'>t and let Ev be the piece of evidence added 
to EC(. Then EC� "' EC7 u{Ev). Ev induces a 
conditioning of Y's beliefs on OL if that piece of evidence 
is relevant to Y's beliefs on ilL. The evidential corpus 
EC7 can also be updated by the removing of a piece of 
evidence from EC;". Then Eve EC( and Eve ECJ". It 
results in a deconditionalization of Y's beliefs on .QL if 
that piece of evidence was relevant to Y's beliefs on QL at 
time t (Klawonn and Smets 1992). These two kinds of 
changes correspond to the expansion and contraction 
processes (Levi, 1980, pg. 25) 
3. CONDITIONING IN THE TBM. 
In this section, we describe the impact of a new pieces of 
evidence within the TBM. Let OL be a frame of 
discernment. A piece of evidence lA is added to EC7 and 
IA is such that Y takes for grant that me A. 
In the TBM, the bbm given to XCOL is transferred to 
XnA. When XnA�. this transfer reflects tlu: nature of 
the TBM and its masses: a bbm given to a set X is a part 
of belief that supports X and might support any subset of 
X if further information justifies such a support to a more 
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specific subset. The information that the worlds in A are 
impossible is the kind of information that justifies such a 
transfer. Y updates his beliefs by conditioning m ( or 
equivalently bel and pl) on A. The resulting bba mA is: 
mA(B) = I, an(BuX) 'v'Bt;:;;A, 
Xt;:;;A 
0 otherwise 
Thus mA(0) = m(0) +bel( A). 
belA, piA are related to mA by relations (I) and (2). The 
results are equivalent to: 
belA (B)= bel(Bu A) -bel( A) 
and piA (B)= pl(AnB) 
This updating corresponds to the unnormalized Dempster's 
rule of conditioning. Justifications of this rule can be 
found in Nguyen and Smets (1991) and in Klawonn and 
Smets (1992). 
4. UPDATING BELIEFS. 
Let nL be the frame of discernment on which Y builds 
his/her beliefs at time t. Let m be the bba that quantifies 
these beliefs that result from EC7. We want to explain 
the meaning of m(0)>0 as encountered in the TBM 
updating. 
4.1. Let us suppose that Y learns the piece of evidence lA 
that the worlds in A happen to be impossible, with 
A t;:;;QL, A'#0. Let bel' be the result of the updating of bel 
by this pieces of evidence, whereas belA is the updating 
obtained in the TBM. bel' is the belief function that 
results from EC7 u{IA)· We give our reason why bel' 
should be belA. 
The transfer of the bbm m(X), Xt;:;;9 to XnA is accepted 
when XnA�. as this transfer is at the core of the TBM. 
What has to be justified is the transfer of bel( A) to 
mA(0) and the non-normalization. 
bel(A) is the sum of the bbm given to the non-empty 
subset of A. The updating information lA says that the 
worlds in A are impossible. Therefore bei(A) was a 
support given by Y at time t to a set of worlds that turns 
out to be impossible. It results from a conflict between 
the beliefs on nL induced by the EC7 and responsible for 
Y's allocation of positive bbm to some non-empty 
subsets of A and the beliefs on QL induced by the new 
piece of evidence IA that says that no positive bbm should 
be allocated to the non-empty subsets of A. So bel( A) 
quantifies the conflict between Y's beliefs at time t and the 
beliefs induced by the updating piece of evidence. It must 
be eliminated, either by a transfer to some kind of 
'absorbing world' that represents a 'contradictory' state, 
denoted as cp, or by being redistributed among the still 
possible worlds by some normalization process. 
Two types of arguments can be used to show that the 
redistribution of bel( A) among the worlds included in A 
is inappropriate. The first is based on the defmition of the 
plausibility, the second on a homomorphisme 
requirement 
For any subset X of the frame of discernment, we defined 
pl(X) as the degree of potential specific support that could 
be given to X. By potential we mean that pi(X) represents 
the maximal degree of justified support that might be 
allocated to X. Being maximal, pi{X) can not increase 
after conditioning. This explains why we require that 
plA(A) = pl(A), in which case the redistribution of bel( A) 
among the subsets of A is not allowed. This argument can 
be questioned as it is based on a particular definition of the 
plausibility . 
For the homomorphisme requirement (Gardenfors, 1988), 
consider two belief functions bel' and bel" defined on a 
frame of discernment nL and a random device which 
outcome indicates which belief function is selected. Let p 
be the probability of bel' being selected and let q=1-p be 
the probability that bel" is selected. Let bel be the belief 
function on nL resulting from the overall schema, so 
bel(X) = p bei'(X) + q bel"(X) 'v'Xt;:;;QL (proved in Smets 
1990b). The homomorphisme requirement states that the 
same relation should hold whatever the conditioning 
subset: 
Homomorphisme requirement : 
If 
then 
bel(X) = p bel'(X) + (1-p) bel"(X) , 
'v'Xt;:;;QL> pE [0,1], 
belA(X)= p bel'A(X) + (1-p) bel"A(X) 
'v'Xt;:;;QL, \1' At;:;;QL 
The homomorphisme is satisfied iff bel( A) is not 
redistributed among the subsets of A: 
Proof: In g eneral belA(X) = bel(Xu A) - bel( A) + 
g(bel(A)) . The first and second terms corresponds to the 
transfer of the bbm given to the subsets of QL compatible 
with A. The third is the fraction of bel( A) due to the 
hypothetical redistribution ofbel(A) among the subsets of 
A. The homomorphisme requirement becomes: for 
pe [0,1], 
V'X�QL, belA (X)= p bel'A(X) + (1-p) bel"A(X) 
or 
bel(Xu A)- bel( A)+ g(bel(A)) = 
p [bel'(Xu A)-bel'( A)+ g'(bel'( A))J + 
(1-p) [bel"(Xu A)-bel"(A) + g"(bel"( A) )J 
where the g functions can depend on the belief function 
considered. 
Given bel(X) = p bel'(X) + (1-p) bel"(X), the last relation 
becomes: 
g(p bel'(A) + (1-p) bel"(A)) = 
p g'(bei'(A)) + (1-p) g"(bel"(A)) 
or g(px + qy) = p g'(x) + q g"(y) 
which solutions for g, g' and g" are linear functions 
(Aczel, 1966, pg. 144 ) .  
So g(x) :::: ax + b, with a and b constant, 
and belA(X) =bel (Xu A) - bcl(A:) + a bel( A) + b. 
The requirement that belA( A) = 0 implies that: a bel(A) 
+ b = 0 whatever bel( A), hence a = b = 0. QED 
The satisfaction of the homomorphisme requirement or 
the definition of the plausibility function imply that 
bel( A) can not be redistributed among the subsets of A. 
So bel(A) can only be transferred to some contradictory 
state <!>or to 0 .  
We show now that there is at most one contradictory state 
<j>. We accept that the updating process is the same when 
applied to a belief function defined on OL or on the 
coarsening of nL obtained by keeping the elernents in A 
and regrouping the elements in A into a single new 
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element. We accept that the updated beliefs obtained in 
both frames are the same. It means that the 'contradictory' 
states absorbing the bbm given to the subsets of A in the 
initial frame of discernment is identical to the 
'contradictory' state absorbing the bbm given to the single 
element representing A in the coarsening of the initial 
frame of discernment. This is true whatever A�QL· 
Therefore there is an unique contradictory state <j>. 
We show finally that cj>=0. By definition, bel(X) and 
pi(X), X �OL, include only those bbm given to non-
empty subsets of X or non-empty subsets compatible 
with X, respectively . Even if <j>i:0, <!>may not be a subset 
of any subset of A, otherwise the bbm bei(A) that was 
transferred to ¢1 would be added into the beliefs given to 
these subsets of A, contrary to the fact that bel( A) may 
not be redistributed among the subsets of A. So ¢1<JA. It 
may neither be a subset of nL compatible with A as 
otherwise plA(A) would become positive in contradiction 
to the fact that all worlds in A are assumed to be 
impossible. So cj>q QL, what is impossible if <J>;t0. 
Therefore the only remaining solution is ¢1=0, in which 
bel'= belA, and bel( A) is thus transferred to mA (0) . 
4.2. We still have to consider the case A=0, i.e.the case 
where all the worlds in nL are impossible. Y would be in 
a state of complete contradiction. It is a situation 
analogous to the one encountered in prob ability theory 
when conditioning on an event of zero probability. No 
natural solution ex ists and therefore could be imposed, 
hence there are no criteria to test the solution. In the 
TBM, such state of complete contradiction is translated by 
m(0)=1, a bba that naturally translates the state of 
complete contradiction to be characterized. 
We have argued that conditioning on the information lA = 
'the worlds in A are impossible' can result in the transfer 
of bel( A) to mA(0). The information lA was added to 
Ec; , Y's evidential corpus at time t, and mA was the 
resulting bba induced by EC� u{IA}. Before lA was added 
to EC7, how to justify that the bbm m(0) induced by 
EC;' could already be positive? It is due to the fact that 
the bba induced by Ec; might already result from a 
conditioning on the pieces of evidence that were present in 
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EC�. Contradiction could already be present in Ecr 2• 
Of course, contradiction within EC7 is not necessarily 
present, in which case bel(il[)= 1. Once pieces of evidence 
accumulate in the evidential corpus, some contradiction 
will soon appear. Y can get rid of this contradiction by a 
deconditionalization process, the process by which the 
pieces of evidence in Ecr that were responsible for the 
contradiction are excluded from EC�. The concept of 
deconditionalization in defined in Klawonn and Smets 
(1992). 
In conclusion, the bbm m(0) quantifies the amount of 
conflict present in Y's beliefs induced by Y's evidential 
corpus EC;" at time 1. Renormalization would remove 
this conflict. This solution permits to hide conflicts but 
might be misleading as as shown in the example described 
by Zadeh (1984). 
5. THE EPISTEMIC CONSTRUCT OF 
THE FRAME OF DISCERNMENT. 
We already studied the belief induced on a frame of 
discernment QL derived from a propositional language L. 
In practice, the frame of discernment can also be built by 
listing the possible worlds, without referring explicitly to 
an underlying propositional language L. The frame of 
discernment is then an epistemic construct 
For this epistemic construct, one acknowledges the 
"limited understanding" of the agent Y that holds the 
beliefs (Walley, 1991). Y establishes a list n.; of 
possible worlds, like the list encountered in a database. 
Because of Y's "limited understanding", Y is not able to 
imagine all the possible worlds. n; contains only those 
worlds that Y can conceive of at time t. The indices in 
n� emphasize the time dependency and the personal 
nature of the frame of discernment Let �; denote the set 
of worlds not conceived by Y at t, but that could have 
been conceived if a logical approach had been taken, i.e. if 
one had started with the language L that underlies the 
worlds in n.;". Thus n; u .11; = QL where QL is the set 
of worlds that correspond to the interpretations of L. 
2 This is not the only possible origin for a positive bbm 
given to 0. It may also results from the application of 
Dempster's rule of combination, what is equivalent to a 
conditioning on a dubious piece of evidence. 
Y's beliefs can be expressed only for the worlds that he 
can conceived of, hence those in n.(. By definition, Y do 
not conceive the worlds in �Y, and therefore Y surely 
cannot express his beliefs that the actual state of affairs m 
corresponds to one of the worlds in �Y. Y's beliefs at 
time t are only expressed for the subsets of worlds in n.7. 
By building n.;", Y acknowledges implicitly -and maybe 
erroneously - that m belongs to n.7, therefore implicitly 
conditioning on n; a belief fWtction that could have been 
defined on QL· So all the bbm are allocated to subsets of 
n.;. As contradiction could already result from this 
conditioning, some m(0)>0 might be encountered. It 
correspponds to the belief that would have been allocated 
y to d,. 
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
In summary, we have shown the nature of m(0)>0. The 
bbm given to 0 at time t quantifies the amount of 
contradiction present at time t in the belief function that 
quantifies Y's beliefs about the set of worlds that are 
conceivable for him at time t. 
A merit of the TBM is that it keeps track of the 
contradiction present in the EC7 . Renormalization as 
done in the Shafer's approach leads to unnatural results 
like the one described by Zadeh (1984). Counterexamples 
like Zadeh's explain why we gave up the normalization 
requirement when we start developing the TBM3• 
Two questions about the meaning of m(0)>0 merit 
consideration. 
6.1. Suppose Y's initial beliefs are such that bel( me Qr) 
= 1, andY learns that m� A by adding the evidence lA to 
EC'{ at t'>t: so EC� =EC;" u{IAJ. How come that 
bel(me A) is not necessarily 1? The answer is to be found 
in the definition of bel: bel is the degree of justified 
support, and m(0) is the amount of inherent contradiction 
present among the beliefs induced on n by Y's evidential 
corpus EC'{ . bel does not quantify unwarranted beliefs. 
For instance, whims are not included in bel. bel quantifies 
3 Historically this occurs during a discussion I had with 
L. Zadeh and R. Yager in a beautiful exotic restaurant in 
Acapulco in 1980. 
warranted supports and the evidential corpus might be 
such that it supports me A somehow, but not fully, 
because it happens that EC� and lA induce some 
contradictory supports on .n. 
The simple example can be encountered ifEv1 = 'Xt says 
me A' and Evz = 'X2 says me A', where X1 and X2 are 
two different induviduals. Let EC� = {Evi}u [Ev2}. Evt 
justifies Y's beliefs that me A, and Ev2 justifies Y's 
beliefs that me A Both beliefS/supports are contradictory, 
and m(0� 1 translates the fact that EC� actually does not 
justify any support for A or A 
Historically, Shafer (1976) already qualified the bbm we 
allocate to 0 as the 'weight of conflict'. A high conflict 
would justify reconsidering how the evidential corpus 
influence beliefs (Laskey and Lehner, 1989). In the last 
example, where m(0)= 1, it is obvious that Y should 
reconsider the impact of the two pieces of evidence Ev1 
and Evz, trying to discount or eliminate the 'most 
unreliable' one. When l>m(0)>0, the largest m(0) the 
more seriously Y should reconsider how his evidential 
corpus influence his beliefs, but there is of course no real 
crisp limit between values of m(0) that would correspond 
to acceptable conflict, and those that would not. It is a 
matter of degree. The way to update the impact of the 
evidential corpus in order to reduce the conflicts on .Q 
require information external to the model. It is not 
considered in this paper. 
6.2. The second question is concerned with beliefs 
induced by randomness. Suppose a random device 
generates the mutually exclusive and exhaustive events 
OOj, i=l, 2, ... n with probabilities Pi· Should we quantify 
our belief that event OOi will occur as bel(roi) = Pi? Does 
randomness warrants support? These questions are left 
open. It seems that the Pi's are the pignistic probabilities 
induced on .Q by an underlying belief on Q (Smets 
1990b). If the Pi'S are not equal, it seems to reflect that 
the evidential corpus justifies some beliefs on some 
subset of n. 
The aim of this paper was not to solve all the open 
questions in relation to m(0)>0, but to provide a meaning 
for it. There are still pending questions that will be studied 
in future papers. 
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